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OVERVIEW OF TASK FORCE PROPOSAL ON
MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY
By Ronald J. Tabak
A. WHY THE TASK FORCE WAS CREATED
In 2003, the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Individual
Rights and Responsibilities (IR&R) formed a Task Force to consider
mental disability and the death penalty. The Task Force includes
professionals knowledgeable in law, psychology, and psychiatry, some of
whom are advocates for people with mental disability.
The impetus for the Task Force's creation was the Supreme Court's
holding in Atkins v. Virginia2 and the reactions thereto. In Atkins, the
Court held that it is unconstitutional to execute people with mental
retardation.3 Within hours after the decision in Atkins was announced,
the National Mental Health Association stated that the same principles
and reasoning that Atkins applied to the mentally retarded were equally
applicable to many with mental illness, who the Association said should
also be categorically exempted from capital punishment.4 Moreover,
public opinion polling showed a strong majority opposing executions of
people with mental illness.'
The ABA IR&R concluded that in view of these developments,
serious consideration should be given to whether some people with
mental illness should be exempt from execution and how to deal with
several issues concerning mental illness of death row inmates.
1. The Task Force's members are: Dr. Michael Abramsky; Dr. Xavier F. Amador;
Michael Allen, Esq.; Donna Beavers; John Blume, Esq.; Professor Richard J. Bonnie;
Colleen Quinn Brady, Esq.; Richard Burr, Esq.; Dr. Joel Dvoskin; Dr. James R.
Eisenberg; Professor I. Michael Greenberger; Dr. Kirk Heilbrun; Ronald Honberg, Esq.;
Ralph Ibson; Dr. Matthew B. Johnson; Professor Dorean M. Koenig; Dr. Diane T. Marsh;
Hazel Moran; John Parry, Esq.; Professor Jennifer Radden; Professor Laura Lee Rovner;
Robyn S. Shapiro, Esq.; Professor Christopher Slobogin; and Ronald J. Tabak, Esq.
2. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
3. Id. at 321. In March 2005 the Supreme Court relied heavily on Atkins in holding
unconstitutional the execution of anyone who was under eighteen-years-old at the time of
the offense. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1192, 1200 (2005).
4. Patty Reinert, Death Penalty Debate Reopened by Court's Retardation Decision,
HOUSTON CHRON., June 22, 2002, at A17; see also Mike Tolson, Ill Inmate Can Find No
Escape, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 4, 2002, at Al (quoting Ronald Honberg, Legal Director
of the National Alliance for the Mentally i11).
5. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., SUMMARIES OF RECENT POLL FINDINGS,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=23&did-210 (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
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B. THE LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Unlike mental retardation, there have not been serious legislative
efforts to exempt people with serious mental illness from the death
penalty. One likely reason for this legislative inaction is that those who
might have wished to propose such legislation could not advocate that
everyone with mental illness should be exempt from execution because
there are various effects and differing degrees of permanency. Whereas
mental retardation is essentially a permanent condition with certain basic
effects, and everyone meeting one of the generally accepted definitions
of mental retardation' is significantly less morally culpable than the
"average" murderer, the same can not be said of everyone with mental
illness. It was apparent to the ABA IR&R that to conceptualize which
mentally ill people should not be executed and under what circumstances
would require considerable additional thought. The ABA IR&R formed
the Task Force in order to facilitate such conceptual thinking.
The ABA IR&R did not expect the Task Force to formulate proposals
that would form the basis for an immediate constitutional challenge, such
as that which ultimately succeeded in Atkins7 (after having previously
failed in the late 1980s in Penry v. Lynaugh'). Since an important basis
for the Supreme Court's holding in Atkins was the fact that eighteen
states had passed laws barring execution of people with mental
retardation,9 it appeared far more likely to the ABA IR&R that the most
immediate impact of adopting a proposal on this subject would be in the
legislative arena. As with mental retardation (and juveniles), such
legislative efforts could be supported by death penalty proponents as
well as opponents.
Although the initial impetus for the Task Force's creation came from
the belief that there likely were categories of people with mental illness
whose mental condition at the time of the crime should exempt them
categorically from the death penalty, the ABA IR&R was also
increasingly troubled by a growing number of instances in which people
already on death row were getting executed despite troublesome facts
about their mental state while on death row. These arose in three
contexts. One concerned death row inmates who were "volunteering" to
end legal and clemency proceedings and be executed, where this
"decision" appeared to have been significantly influenced by serious
mental illness. A second concerned people who were not mentally able
6. See, e.g., AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THE AAMR DEFINITION OF
MENTAL RETARDATION (2002), available at http://iwww.aamr.org/Policies/pdf/
definitionofMR.pdf.
7. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310, 321.
8. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
9. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15.
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to assist counsel or otherwise participate meaningfully with respect to
potentially meritorious issues following their initial appeal-where the
post-conviction and habeas corpus proceedings nonetheless proceeded.
The third context involved people who were being found "competent"
for execution even though they did not truly understand why they were
to be executed, or where, after having been found incompetent to be
executed, an inmate was medicated for the sole purpose of enabling him
to be executed.
An important point to recognize is that nothing that the Task Force
was asked to consider, and nothing in the proposal it developed, would
preclude anyone from being convicted of capital murder and being
severely punished for it, up to and including life imprisonment without
possibility of parole. Thus, the Task Force was addressing issues very
different from insanity cases. Typically, someone who is found insane
cannot be found guilty. Often, such people can be confined only as long
as they remain insane.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TASK FORCE'S PROPOSAL, AND ITS
CONSIDERATION BY PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
After organizational meetings in late 2003 and early 2004, the Task
Force began substantive work. By mid-2004, the Task Force had
developed a proposal with three prongs. Later that year, the National
Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) adopted the first two prongs of this
proposal as policy. 10 In February 2005 so did the American Psychological
Association." In November 2004 the American Psychiatric Association
adopted as policy prong two of the Task Force's proposal.1
2
In the Spring of 2005, after further consultation with representatives of
the American Psychiatric Association, the Task Force approved refined
versions of prongs one and three of its proposal. 3 As of this writing, it is
considered likely that later in 2005 the American Psychiatric Association
10. See PUB. POLICY COMM. OF THE BD. OF DIRS. & DEP'T OF PUB. POLICY &
RESEARCH, NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL, PUBLIC POLICY PLATFORM OF
THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL §§ 9.6.1.1-.2 (rev. 7th ed. 2004).
11. See American Psychological Association, Exerpt from the Council of
Representatives 2005 Meeting Minutes (Feb. 18-20, 2005) (on file with the Catholic
Unviersity Law Review).
12. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY IN CAPITAL
SENTENCING: POSITION STATEMENT (2004), available at http://www.psych.org/edu/other
_res/lib archives/archives/200406.pdf.
13. The latest version of the entire Task Force proposal, including the revised prongs
one and three, are set forth in this Issue. Recommendations of the American Bar
Association Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities Task Force on Mental
Disability and the Death Penalty, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1115 (2005) [hereinafter Task Force
Recommendations].
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will adopt as policy the refined versions of prongs one and three and that
either in late 2005 or early 2006 NAMI and the American Psychological
Association will revise their policies to incorporate the refinements to
prongs one and three. It is anticipated that in February 2006 the ABA
House of Delegates will be asked to approve as policy the Task Force's
entire proposal.
D. PRINCIPLE UNDERLYING THE FIRST TWO PRONGS OF THE TASK
FORCE'S PROPOSAL
As noted above, the first two prongs of the Task Force's proposal
make categorical exclusions from death penalty eligibility. 14 The first
prong deals with people with mental retardation and with others who are
functionally the same as those with mental retardation but whose
disability did not commence during childhood years." The second prong
deals with people whose severe mental illness at the time of the crime
makes them, in the Task Force's view, sufficiently less morally culpable
for their actions than the "average murderer" 6 such that they should not
be subject to the death penalty."
With regard to those individuals covered by these prongs, the Task
Force believes that important rationales in Atkins are equally applicable.
As Ronald Honberg's article points out, the Court in Atkins said that
concerns regarding retribution and deterrence, upon which it had relied
in upholding the constitutionality of capital punishment in Gregg v.
Georgia, were of dubious applicability where the defendant has mental
retardation. '9 The retribution rationale presupposes the absence of a
compelling mitigating factor2°-yet mental retardation is such a factor.
As for deterrence, the Court doubted that capital punishment would
deter people whose mental retardation lessens impulse control, planning
capability, and the ability to formulate a calculated scheme to kill
21someone.
Moreover, as Mr. Honberg points out, the Atkins Court also cited the
danger that people with mental retardation would be more likely to
make coerced or otherwise false "confessions," to have a demeanor
caused by their disability that would make jurors less likely to vote
14. Id. §§ 1-2.
15. Id. § L.
16. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-20 (2002).
17. See Task Force Recommendations, supra note 13, § 2.
18. 428 U.S. 153, 183,187 (1976) (plurality opinion).
19. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-20; Ronald Honberg, The Injustice of Imposing Death
Sentences on People with Severe Mental Illnesses, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1153, 1158 (2005).
20. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
21. Id. at 319-20.
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against the death penalty, and to be less able to help counsel develop
important mitigating evidence.2 The Task Force feels that such dangers
also exist with regard to those individuals covered by prongs one or two.
Professor Slobogin's article discusses a basis on which some would
disagree with both of these prongs, just as they disagree with Atkins. 3
These people say that such categorical exclusions stigmatize everyone
with mental retardation or severe mental illness by suggesting they lack
certain key qualities of human beings.24 However, as noted above, these
prongs do not say that such people cannot form sufficient intent to make
them guilty of capital murder.2 ' Rather, these prongs are premised on
the view that certain categories of people cannot be sufficiently depraved
to warrant the death penalty-as opposed to other punishments,
including life without parole.
It is important, in this connection, to recognize that this same issue was
debated within the community of advocates for, and family members of,
people with mental retardation during the legislative efforts preceding
26Atkins. Ultimately, all of the leading groups took the position that
people with mental retardation should be exempt from capital
punishment.2 7 Significantly, the first organization to support the Task
Force's proposal was NAMI,28 the leading grassroots advocacy group for
those with mental illness.29
E. PARTICULAR POINT REGARDING PRONG ONE
As Professor Slobogin's article points out, prong one is designed, inter
alia, to help jurisdictions better implement Atkins by providing a
definition for mental retardation .3  This definition is almost identical to
that of the American Association of Mental Retardation and is
consistent with that of the American Psychiatric Association.
3 1
As Professor Slobogin also notes, prong one exempts from the death
penalty anyone whose disability at the time of the offense is functionally
the same as mental retardation, with the only difference being that the
22. Id. at 320-21; Honberg, supra note 19, at 1158.
23. Christopher Slobogin, Mental Disorder as an Exemption from the Death Penalty:
The ABA-IRR Task Force Recommendations, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1133, 1136-39. 1147-50
(2005).
24. Id. at 1136-37.
25. See supra Part B, p. 1125.
26. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
27. See id.
28. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
29. See Honberg, supra note 19, at 1154.
30. See Slobogin, supra note 23, at 1134.
31. Id.
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disorder causing great intellectual deficits arose after childhood.32 An
example is a significant loss of intellectual functioning, leading to an IQ
in the mental retardation range, arising from a very serious head
trauma.33
F. PARTICULAR POINTS REGARDING PRONG Two
Prong two proposes exempting from the death penalty some of those
who, at the time of the crime, have such serious mental illness that their
culpability is as diminished as those with mental retardation.34 This lesser
extent of culpability arises from such effects of their mental illness as
delusions, hallucinations, significant thought disorders, and highly
disorganized thinking. This exemption would apply to those with such
disorders as schizophrenia and psychosis, but not anti-social personality
disorder.
However, having a severe mental disorder such as schizophrenia or
psychosis at the time of the crime would not be sufficient to exempt an
individual from capital punishment under prong two. In addition, the
disorder must lead to one of three kinds of significant incapacity as of the
time of the crime. As Professor Slobogin's article describes in greater
detail, the disorder must (a) lessen the nature, consequences, or
wrongfulness of the offense; (b) involve a significant incapacity "to
exercise rational judgment in relation to conduct"; or (c) entail a
significant incapacity "to conform their conduct to the requirements of
the law.,
35
In any event, one would not come within the exemption provided by
prong two if one's mental disorder were manifested primarily by
repeated criminal conduct or were manifested solely by the acute impact
of alcohol or drugs.
G. ADDITIONAL CONCERNS UNDERLYING PRONG TWO
The principle underlying prong two is discussed in Part D, above. Also
of relevance in this regard are other, practical concerns. One such
concern is the likelihood, as shown by the Capital Jury Project studies,
that jurors will consider the severe mental illnesses covered by prong two
to be aggravating factors,36 i.e., factors making it more likely that they will
vote for the death penalty, whereas the law requires that they be
32. Id. at 1135.
33. Id.
34. See Task Force Recommendations, supra note 13, § 2.
35. Slobogin, supra note 23, at 1142-44.
36. See Scott E. Sundbv, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries
Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1165-66 (1997).
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considered, if at all, as mitigating factors, i.e., factors making it less likely
that they will vote for the death penalty. This is often the case because
jurors frequently equate severe mental illness with a greater likelihood of
being dangerous in the future.37
This problem is compounded by the fact that jurors often do not
understand what the word "mitigating" means.38 They often think that it
means the same as "aggravating., 39 They also often do not understand
that the defendant does not have to prove a mitigating factor beyond a
reasonable doubt -reasonable doubt being a concept that they are used
to from the guilt phase." They also often do not understand the
instruction that even if only one juror finds a factor to be mitigating, that
juror can consider it in his or her vote on the death penalty.4' Most jurors
believe, incorrectly, that every member of the jury must consider a factor
to be mitigating in order for anyone to consider it.
42
Some defendants forbid their attorneys from presenting evidence of
mental illness at trial-sometimes due to the potential for
embarrassment or the desire to shield their families from embarrassment,
and other times because of their refusal or inability to believe that they
have a severe mental illness. Obviously, even a juror who realizes that
severe mental illness is relevant, if at all, only as a mitigating factor, and
who recognizes what "mitigating" means and how to bring it to bear,
cannot consider a defendant's severe mental illness when no evidence
about it is presented.
A factor that numerous jury studies have shown is crucial in capital
sentencing is whether the defendant appears to show remorse.43 Many
people with certain kinds of mental illness do not-due to medication
they are given to treat that mental illness-show much emotion of any
kind about anything while in court." This is often misinterpreted by the
37. See id. at 1166.
38. See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project. Rationale, Design, and Preview
of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1053-54 (1995).
39. See id.
40. Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in
Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1993); James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe,
Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161,
1167 (1995).
41. Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 40, at 1167.
42. Id.
43. Sundby, supra note 36, at 1560; see also Theodore Eisenberg et al., But Was He
Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599, 1616-17
(1998).
44. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 143 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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jury, particularly if there is no expert testimony offered by the defense to
45
explain to the jury why the defendant may not show remorse.
H. SUMMARY OF PRONG THREE
The Task Force proposal's third prong deals with mental illness's
impact on prisoners who have already been sentenced to death.46 As
Professor Bonnie's article discusses, these include prisoners who, as a
result of their mental illness, seek to "volunteer" for execution;
"[p]risoners whose mental illness impairs their ability to assist [counsel]
or otherwise to participate meaningfully in post-conviction [or habeas
corpus] proceedings;" and "[p]risoners whose impaired understanding of




Prong three would prevent the waiver of claims by inmates whose
mental illness is a principal factor in their decision to "volunteer" for
execution.4 8  Also under prong three, post-conviction or habeas
proceedings would be suspended if death row inmates cannot assist
counsel or otherwise participate meaningfully on issues as to which they
might- secure relief from their conviction or death sentence. 49 Finally,
under prong three, if a person facing a reasonably imminent execution is
so mentally disabled that he does not understand why the state is going
to execute him, his sentence would be reduced to a non-death sentence."
I. PARTICULAR POINTS REGARDING PRONG THREE
Professor Bonnie's article summarizes the bases for prong three, and
discusses how it would work.5 The following are a few high points.
The Task Force believes it is unacceptable to permit death row
inmates to forgo or drop post-conviction and habeas corpus proceedings
challenging their convictions or sentences where their mental disorders
significantly impair their ability to decide rationally whether to pursue
such relief. As Mr. Honberg's article states, "the pain ... of living with a
severe mental illness is [sometimes] so [great] that death may seem like a
better alternative," particularly in light of egregious death row conditions
and, in some cases, the failure to provide them with medical treatment
45. See Sundby, supra note 36, at 1558, 1595.
46. See Task Force Recommendations, supra note 13, § 3.
47. Richard J. Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisoners on Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles for
Courts and Legislatures, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1169 (2005).
48. See Task Force Recommendations, supra note 13, § 3(b).
49. See Task Force Recommendations, supra note 13, § 3(c).
50. See Task Force Recommendations, supra note 13, § 3(d).
51. Bonnie, supra note 47, at 1169-70.
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for their severe mental disorder(s).52 As he points out, such defendants
usually change their minds after being medicated and stabilized.53
Under the Task Force proposal, a next friend acting on an inmate's
behalf should be allowed to initiate or pursue post-conviction or habeas
corpus remedies at times when the inmate is unable, due to mental
disorder(s), from rationally deciding to begin or carry through with such
litigation.
The Task Force also believes that where a mental disorder significantly
impairs a death row inmate's ability to assist counsel, yet the inmate's
participation is necessary for a fair and accurate adjudication of specific
claims in post-conviction or habeas corpus proceedings, those
proceedings should be suspended. It would be fundamentally unfair to
decide claims adversely to a mentally disabled death row inmate who
might have succeeded on those claims if he had been able to assist his
counsel. Under the Task Force's proposal, an inmate's death sentence
should be reduced if there is no significant likelihood of the inmate's
becoming able to assist his counsel with regard to such claims in the
foreseeable future.
Finally, the Task Force's proposal regarding people facing reasonably
imminent execution is necessary because, although the Supreme Court
held in Ford v. Wainwright5 4 that it is unconstitutional to execute people
who have become incompetent for execution,5 it did not provide a clear
definition of such incompetence. Although this issue does not arise in
most cases, there are a wide variety of holdings in those cases in which it
has arisen. Some of these are very troubling.
For example, in Barnard v. Collins,6 the Fifth Circuit held that Mr.
Barnard was competent to be executed even though he suffered from the
delusion that he was chosen for execution as the result of a conspiracy of
various societal groups and the Mafia. 7 In 2004, a Texas federal district
judge relied on Barnard in holding that Scott Panetti was competent for
execution -despite his delusion that the State and forces of evil were
conspiring against him and that he was going to be executed for
preaching the gospel.58  Under the Task Force proposal, the death
sentences of such people would be vacated, and a lesser punishment
imposed.
52. Honberg, supra note 19, at 1165.
53. Id.
54. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
55. Id. at 409-10.
56. 13 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 1994).
57. Id. at 876-78.
58. Panetti v. Dretke, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, at 16-18 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2004)
(order denying writ of habeas corpus and staying execution pending appeal).
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